The final chapter reviews the major concepts covered in the preceding chapters: institutional transaction costs; how those transaction costs influence the spontaneity and choice of government; and the outcomes of policy experimentation. In particular, the authors employ brief case studies to illustrate how property rights can encourage stakeholders to utilize their resources efficiently in the pursuit of shared goals. The authors also describe ways in which the five types of urban order (organizational, proprietary, public domain, spatial, and institutional) interact.

Webster and Lai also praise competitive markets for their capacity to transmit accurate information in the form of prices. According to our authors, resources for which a competitive market can be created are rarely subject to an information-deficit problem or wasteful competition costs. However, since certain resources tend to be left in the public domain and are not subject to competitive markets, the spontaneous order that evolves is frequently considered to be defective due to imperfect information and the lack of clarity regarding property rights and liabilities.

The authors recommend that governments attempt to collect accurate information to prevent or resolve information asymmetries. The authors propose the following theory: when government transaction costs are low, institutions and the order they produce tend to converge towards relatively efficient solutions. Alternatively, when transaction costs with (or without) governments are high, one can expect lower levels of institutional responsiveness, a slowdown in the spontaneous evolution of social order, and resistance to change within those very institutions in effect, a stifling of efficient governance.